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Disaggregating diasporas as actors
By Carolin Fischer
Much research on diasporas emphasises the ties between those 
inside and outside the country of origin, usually in connection with 
transnational flows of money, ideas, and goods. Diasporas are often 
represented as actors whose engagements have significant effects 
back home. The promotion of diasporas as a panacea to shortcomings 
in development or as players in home country politics triggered 
sceptical reactions of scholars. Many call the conceptual basis of such 
representations into question (Sinatti and Horst 2014).
In his contribution to this collection, Nicholas Van Hear makes 
a convincing case for a more nuanced approach to the involvement 
of diasporas in origin countries. He shows that transnational 
activities are not necessarily directed towards the home country as 
such. Rather they target different types of collectives or – in Van 
Hear’s terminology – ‘spheres of engagement’, which entail different 
combinations of the private and the public. However, it is rarely asked 
why (groups of) people living in the diaspora direct their engagement 
towards certain spheres in the origin country and how they are 
socially organised as actors.
Drawing on qualitative data from research among Afghan diaspora 
populations in the UK and Germany I suggest that we should not only 
disaggregate the spheres towards which transnational engagements 
are directed but also disentangle the social settings in which people 
take action. I discovered that social identities and the inter-personal 
ties, which connect people at a specific destination country and across 
borders, constitute a particularly important dimension of these ‘action 
settings’. Adopting a more actor-centred perspective that unpacks 
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the ‘inner workings’ of diaspora helps understand how members of 
diasporas come to engage with their origin countries.
The fact that diaspora populations are not homogeneous 
entities that engage in joint action towards shared goals is widely 
acknowledged. It is equally recognised that social identities within 
diasporas are often contested (Anthias 1998). Not everyone identifies 
with the local and globally dispersed population of co-nationals to 
the same extent and along the same lines. During fieldwork among 
Afghan diaspora populations in Germany and the UK I found that 
people rarely encounter each other simply as ‘Afghans’. Instead 
perceptions are filtered through a range of identity categories among 
which family and socio-economic backgrounds, ethnicity and 
political affiliations are prominent.
Families form an important dimension of people’s social 
environment in the receiving society as Razma32 (26), a young 
professional from Greater London, illustrates:
We kind of keep mostly in the family. So I interact mostly with mum, 
dad, my cousins. I’ve got family abroad: New York, Canada… We have 
a close-knit family relationship but we never really get involved with 
anything outside of that.
Families also indicate people’s socio-economic backgrounds and thus 
reflect the social stratification of the Afghan society (Bourdieu 1984). 
Shabnam (25), a university student living in mid-west Germany, 
illustrates how family backgrounds shape the way people approach 
each other and navigate within social environments:
‘I can tell you what happens if Afghans get to know other Afghans’, 
Shabnam claims. ‘They will say “oh, you are Afghan too… where do 
your parents come from, which city?” That’s how Afghans localise each 
other. It is like you would ask someone in Afghanistan “where do your 
parents come from?” It’s the same in Germany. You want to have an 
idea of people’s family.’
Families in this sense are constitutive for self-identification and 
external categorisation. Likewise ethnic backgrounds not only inform 
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mutual perceptions and categorisation but also determine patterns of 
social organisation and principles of inclusion and exclusion (Jenkins 
1994). Abdul-Samad (in his 60s) is representative of those who feel 
that Afghan diaspora organisations are not necessarily open and 
approachable for everyone:
There are some organisations who have established a community centre, 
whatever, for certain groups of Afghans. For instance there is one for 
Pashtuns, one for Hazaras, probably one for Tajiks…
As a result he frequently encounters people claiming ‘oh no, I can’t go 
to that one because I am not of that [particular group]’ or ‘I have been 
to that one [organisation] and I was not welcomed’. Whether such 
perceptions are based on real antagonisms or merely perceptions is 
difficult to discern. Either way, what matters most is the divisive effect 
of real and perceived ethnic biases. Over time and through frequent 
reiteration, preconceptions can lead to the formation of social 
boundaries that delineate self-contained groups.
The boundaries delineating groups of characteristics based on 
family ties, ethnic origin, political affiliation or socio-economic 
background, are subject to temporal and local variability. Ethnicity, for 
example, only gained significance as a category of difference among 
Afghans in the diaspora after the onset of the ‘ethnicisation of politics’ 
(Schetter 2005) in wartime Afghanistan. Ethnicity as a subject of 
warfare and political rhetoric was extended to the diaspora, prompting 
instances of ethnic divisions and segregation of wider communities. 
Such contingencies reify continuous formation and re-formation of 
diasporas. It is important to note that individuals represent various 
identity categories and partake in various social collectives. They 
are part of distinct family structures, members of ethnic groups and 
representatives of political views. Yet they are also part of a wider 
imagined Afghan community (see Figure 1). Ferdaws (in his mid-
30s), a PhD student living in Greater London, makes this explicit:
I am part of the Afghans, so I cannot be disconnected, no matter where I 
live, no matter what I think. I am an Afghan and I am proud of that, so 
I want to be part of them, no matter where or no matter what.
Governance and mobilisation: old and new actors
183
Ferdaws’ self-perceptions mark a stark contrast to the more narrowly 
defined ideas of belonging outlined above.
The fractures of diaspora populations also shape the social 
settings in which people engage in transnational activities directed 
towards the country of origin. Engagements undertaken in a family 
context tend to be geared towards the support of family members 
in Afghanistan. By contrast, engagements undertaken by wider 
coalitions of actors in the diaspora tend to reach out to a target group 
that is defined in broader terms, such as ‘known community’. Hence 
respondents’ transnational engagements do not only derive from the 
ties they maintain with Afghanistan and their ideas and desires for 
change. They are also a response to the specificities of their social 
environments in the diaspora.
Notwithstanding fractured patterns of social organisation, the 
research discovered a general tendency among respondents to act in 
the name of an imagined community or an imaginary Afghanistan. 
This imagined community reflects crosscutting home country 
attachments and a widely shared sense of ‘being Afghan’. Moreover, 
similar ideas of change and development and taking action with the 










Figure 1. Social organisation among Afghan diaspora populations
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of action rest on more narrowly defined social ties, which largely 
derive from the identity categories discussed. People may take action 
in the name of an imagined Afghan community, but the imagined 
community does not provide a basis for social mobilisation. Afghans 
in the diaspora do engage with Afghanistan but they do not act as a 
cohesive diaspora.
The specification of the nature and setup of diasporas as actors 
has important implications for the agency exercised in the context 
of transnational engagements (Kleist 2008; Mohan 2002). We do 
not learn much about the agency of diasporans if we focus on 
the outcomes of engagement (Raghuram 2009; Sinatti and Horst 
2014). When trying to explain agency it is necessary to capture the 
‘inner workings’ of Afghan diaspora populations. My examination 
of Afghan transnational engagements suggests that agency is an 
interactive response of actors to their specific relationships with the 
origin country and groups of co-nationals in the receiving country 
and beyond. 
